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In a famous passage in his Ethics, Aristotle considers the nature of equity
and its relation to justice.1 His conclusion seems to be that equity’s role is
to prevent the law from adhering too rigidly to its own rules and principles
when those rules and principles produce injustice. Hence equity permits
judges to depart from legal principle in order to promote justice. In this ar-
ticle, however, I argue that this conclusion is problematic as it is inconsistent
with other claims Aristotle makes, both in his short discussion of equity in
the Ethics and elsewhere. Accordingly, I suggest a reinterpretation of Aris-
totle’s view that explains more satisfactorily the connection between law, in
its various senses, and justice.
II. FORMS AND KINDS OF JUSTICE
For Aristotle, “justice” has both a particular and a general meaning. In its
general sense, it is a synonym for virtue; the just man being the virtuous
or good man. Conversely, in its more particular sense, the only sense with
which we are interested here, justice is concerned with only part of virtue:
giving persons their due. Aristotle maintains that particular justice has two
forms: distributive and corrective.2 He also describes a kind of justice—legal
justice—and identifies equity in relation to both legal justice and particular
justice.
* I would like to thank John Gardner and the anonymous reviewer for Legal Theory.
1. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, 198–200 [1137a32–1138a3] (J.A.K. Thomson, trans., 1976). See also
Aristotle, Rhetoric, in ARISTOTLE: THE COMPLETE WORKS 2152, 2188 [1374a25–b23] (Jonathan
Barnes ed., 1984). I adopt Thompson’s translation of the Ethics for the most part because it is
most friendly to the view I argue against.
2. The translation is often “commutative justice” or “rectificatory justice.” I choose to adopt
“corrective justice” as that is the term most familiar to lawyers. In the following, I ignore the




In order to understand the relationship of these concepts, it is necessary
to comprehend the distinction between forms or species of justice3 and
what I refer to as kinds or types of justice. There are many kinds of justice.
Aristotle focuses on legal justice and political justice, but there are many
others: justice within the family,4 between academic colleagues, and so on.
Justice comes in kinds because the content of justice varies with respect to
different activities.5 Justice in the home is different from justice amongst
one’s colleagues. Nevertheless, all kinds of justice are species of the overar-
ching particular justice—I refer to this here as “absolute justice.” Hence one
action may be just from the perspective of one kind of justice, unjust from
the perspective of another, but absolutely just or unjust. Imagine that I have
a son and a daughter and that my daughter is one of my students. If I spend
much time on all of my students then, as a matter of distributive academic
justice (if we can speak of such), I may be obliged to spend time with my
daughter that means that I cannot spend an equal amount of time with my
son. But this may be said to be inconsistent with distributive parental justice.
Nevertheless, it will be possible to say that some action—likely to be some
sort of compromise—is absolutely distributively just.
On the other hand, the forms of justice correspond to general methods of
evaluating justice: either in terms of the overall spread of “honour or money
or such other assets as are divisible among members of the community” (dis-
tributive justice) or in terms of rectifying “the conditions of a transaction”
(corrective justice).6 Hence there are only two forms of justice.
At least in theory, there are some actions to which neither form of justice
applies: those that do not distribute honor, money, or other relevant assets
and do not involve gains and losses in transactions. Other actions involve one
form of justice, and some involve both. With respect to that last set of actions,
distributive and corrective justice may come into conflict. For instance, an
action may be correctively unjust but distributively just (stealing from the
rich to give to the poor?) or vice versa. In such circumstances, it is impossible
to say that the action is just or unjust overall. There is no overall form of
justice that captures both distributive and corrective justice. Hence, while
such an action may be good or bad overall—because, say, the distributive
justice is more important than the corrective injustice—we cannot say that it
is absolutely just or unjust.
Accordingly, there are two forms of absolute justice: absolute distributive
justice and absolute corrective justice. In cases in which only one type of jus-
tice is relevant, this presents no difficulty. However, in cases involving both
forms of justice, the conflict between distributive and corrective justice is im-
portant and, as discussed below, relates to Aristotle’s doctrine of equity. For
the sake of simplicity and clarity, I postpone that discussion for the moment
3. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 70 [1130b30–131a1] (Terence Irwin, trans., 1999).
4. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 1, at 189 [1134b10–13].
5. Id.
6. Id. at 176–177 [1130b30–1131a1].
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and assume that the cases under investigation involve actions that are
relevant either to distributive justice or to corrective justice but not to both.
III. JUSTICE AND EQUITY
One consequence of the above is that legal justice is not absolute justice
(distributive or corrective) but is the kind of justice appropriate to the activity
of doing law, in a sense to be elucidated below. In consequence, Aristotle
maintains that legal justice exhibits certain deficiencies from the perspective
of absolute justice. One reason for this is that “all law is universal, and there
are some things about which it is not possible to pronounce rightly in general
terms.”7 The latter claim is a product of Aristotle’s view that in ethics “we
must be satisfied with a broad outline of the truth; that is, in arguing about
what is for the most part so from premises which are for the most part true
we must be content to draw conclusions that are similarly qualified.”8 We
may summarize this by saying that for Aristotle, ethical truth is too complex
to be captured by any finite consistent set of principles. Hence a system that
insisted on the observation of principles could not realize justice.
Here, then, we can see why Aristotle would hold that legal justice cannot
perfectly map onto absolute justice. As “all law is universal”—that is, as all law
is expressed in terms of universal principles—it is guaranteed to generate
unjust results in some cases.
Equity fills the gap between legal justice and absolute justice. The content
of equity consists of those judgments required to reconcile the former with
the latter. Say that legal justice dictates that A is bound to do X but it is (all
things considered) unjust to require A to do X. Legal justice is that part
of morality that dictates that A is to do X; absolute justice is the part that
permits A not to do X; and equity is the part that acts on legal justice to
restrict its operation so that A does not in fact have to do X. Equity, then,
is not justice itself but the part of morality that corrects the deficiencies of
legal justice.
[W]hen the law states a general rule, and a case arises under this that is ex-
ceptional, then it is right, where the legislator owing to the generality of his
language has erred in not covering that case, to correct the omission by a ruling
such as the legislator himself would have given if he had been present there,
and as he would have enacted if he had been aware of the circumstances.9
In a recent exploration of this view, John Gardner maintains that this
implies an essential separation between law and justice. Because law must
be expressed too generally to map onto absolute justice, “the fact that they
ought to be just . . . tells against legal systems being too true to their ruly
7. Id. at 199 [1137b14–17] (reference omitted).
8. Id. at 64 [1094b20–23].
9. Id. at 199 [1137b20–24].
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natures.”10 He insists that equity permits judges to depart from law in order
to realize justice: equity is justice’s rebellion against law.11 In the following,
I refer to this as “the doctrine of equitable discretion.” The notion is that
Aristotle argues that judges have the authority to depart from legal justice
and from legal rules on the basis of equity. According to Gardner, there-
fore, Aristotle does not accept the view of legal formalists that “grotesquely
self-congratulatory doctrine that law, so long as it remains true to its own
distinctive form, cannot but be just.”12
IV. PROBLEMS
A. Legal Justice
The claim that equity permits judges to depart from legal justice in order to
realize absolute justice makes the interpretation of legal justice problematic.
What is legal justice? The intuitive answer is that it is the justice enforced
in courts of law. But, given the doctrine of equitable discretion, courts of
law do not enforce legal justice. Rather, due to the operation of equity, the
courts implement absolute justice. What, then, is legal justice?
One answer is provided by translating these issues into the language of
the common law. According to this view, legal justice is the justice applicable
to the common law, equity is the justice applicable to Equity,13 and absolute
justice is the result of the combination of common law and Equity.
But this solution trades inappropriately on the peculiar meanings of the
words “law” and “Equity” in the common law. For common lawyers, “law”
and “common law” have two relevant meanings. Speaking roughly, the terms
relate either to the decisions of courts minus the application of Equity or
simply to the decisions of courts. One might say that law equals law plus
Equity. But these distinctions were of no significance in ancient Greece.
For Aristotle, “law” cannot refer to what we call law-as-in-law-minus-Equity;
rather, it must refer to what we call law-as-in-law-plus-Equity. The conclusion
must be that legal justice is not the justice that the law enforces; but without
explanation, that is a curious position.
A second answer to our question is that legal justice is synonymous with
the positive law or perhaps with a coherent account of the positive law. On
10. John Gardner, The Virtue of Justice and the Character of Law, 53 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1,
18 (2000).
11. Id. at 16. At least, this must be Gardner’s argument if it is to connect with the views he
intends to attack. For instance, though he rejects Weinrib’s formalism, that theory does not
apply to issues such as law reform outside the courtroom. See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA
OF PRIVATE LAW 70, 210–211 (1995). For similar interpretations of Aristotle to Gardner’s, see,
e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, The History of Natural Law Theory: Transforming Embedded Influences into a
Fuller Understanding of Modern Contract Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 839 (1999); Richard W. Wright,
The Principles of Justice, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1859 (2000); Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity:
An Analysis of The Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEXAS L. REV. 2083 (2001).
12. Gardner, supra note 10, at 12. Gardner’s chief target here is Ernest Weinrib.
13. For clarity I capitalize “Equity” when referring to the area of Anglo-American law.
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this view we might say, in the language of the modern common law, that legal
justice equates with precedent or with extant legal principle, and the role
of equity is to reform the law—through judicial overruling, legislation, and
so on—so that legal justice (the positive law) better reflects absolute justice.
On this interpretation, it is easy to see why Gardner would regard legal
formalism as “grotesquely self-congratulatory.”14 If the form of the law cor-
responds to legal justice, and legal justice is identified with the positive law,
then the formalist claims that the positive law must be just whatever it is.
Clearly, Gardner is right that this is not Aristotle’s view.
However, the idea that legal justice equates with the positive law does
not sit well with Aristotle’s discussion. For Aristotle, the various kinds of
justice are not merely descriptions of beliefs about justice or conventional
accounts of virtue. Rather, the kinds of justice are parts of virtue. Accordingly,
unless we have good reason to do otherwise, “legal justice” should be read
as referring to the way that the law should be, not necessarily to the way that
it is. Legal justice is the justice that the law should instantiate.
Moreover, it is impossible to understand Aristotle’s claim that legal justice
dictates that law be expressed in general terms15 on the reading that legal
justice equates with the positive law. Aristotle maintains that, when the law
is too general to capture absolute justice, “the law is none the less right;
because the error lies not in the law nor in the legislator, but in the nature
of the case.”16 But if legal justice was synonymous with the positive law, then
surely it would follow that legal justice is at least occasionally inappropriately
general. Consequently, the exploration of legal justice must be read as an
examination of the natural law and not merely a reflection of the positive
law of some society.17
This demonstrates that even were Gardner right to identify the form of
the law with legal justice, in an important sense “so long as it remains true
to its own distinctive form [the law] cannot but be just.”18 On Gardner’s
reading, the law’s form is legal justice, which is a kind of justice according
to Aristotle, though it is to some extent deficient.19
More important, if the doctrine of equitable discretion were correct, then
it would be unintuitive to regard the form of the law as corresponding to
legal justice. For a legal formalist, the law’s form dictates how judges should
decide cases.20 Hence, accepting the doctrine of equitable discretion, the
14. Gardner, supra note 10, at 12.
15. Supra note 1, at 199 [1137b20–24].
16. Id. at 199 [1137b15–20].
17. Cf. Tony Burns, Aristotle and Natural Law, 19 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 142, 162–166 (1998)
(exploring Aristotle’s natural law theory).
18. Gardner, supra note 10, at 12.
19. It may appear incoherent to argue that a kind of justice can be deficient: If it is deficient,
then it is not justice. However, it must be recalled that legal justice, like political justice, is the
justice relevant to some kind of activity. In Aristotle’s view, the justice relevant to some types of
activity may be appropriate to that activity but to some extent inconsistent with absolute justice.
See infra, text accompanying notes 43–59, 67.
20. Weinrib, supra note 11, at ch. 2.
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form of the law could relate only to legal justice plus equity and not to
legal justice alone. On this approach, legal formalism does not appear at all
“grotesquely self-congratulatory”;21 ironically, it appears to match Gardner’s
own view.22
The above leads to a third answer to our question as to the nature of legal
justice. Perhaps the idea is that legal rules should be generated according to
legal justice. However, as no rules of any kind can perfectly capture absolute
justice, courts are permitted to depart from legal rules when they are incon-
sistent with legal justice. This seems to be Gardner’s view in arguing that
“the fact that they ought to be just . . . tells against legal systems being too
true to their ruly natures.”23 On its face, this asserts that it is in the nature of
the law to depart from its own nature. However, Gardner should be taken
to mean that courts should not be bound by legal rules, even if those rules
equate to justice as closely as it is possible for rules to do.
On this view, legal rules are generalizations true for the most part24 and
hence are not binding on judges. However, while these “rules” may serve to
remind judges of salient moral considerations and may give an appearance
of predictability to the law, as they are in no way binding, it seems odd to
describe them as legal rules. Moreover, on this view, legal justice is the kind
of justice that underlies legal “rules.” But legal rules do not oblige courts
of law and hence do not capture the justice that the law actually enforces.
Though this is not incoherent, one would have thought that legal justice was
more important and had more to do with the decisions of courts than that.
I conclude that the interpretation under examination cannot readily ex-
plain the nature of legal justice.
B. Law and Arbitration
The second problem with the notion that Aristotle argues in favor of eq-
uitable discretion is the following. Almost immediately after the quotation
above, thought to assert that judges may depart from law on the basis of
equity,25 Aristotle goes on to say that “[t]his in fact is also the reason why
everything is not regulated by law: it is because there are some cases that
no law can be framed to cover, so that they require special ordinance.”26
If Aristotle argues for the doctrine of equitable discretion, then it is hard
to know what to make of this. Aristotle appears to claim that some areas of
human life are ill suited to regulation by law because they are so complex
that justice with respect to them cannot be captured by universal principles.
21. Gardner, supra note 10, at 12.
22. Id. at 18.
23. Id.
24. Cf. John McDowell, Virtue and Reason, 62 MONIST 331, 336 (1979) (exploring the nature
of moral “rules” in Aristotle’s thought).
25. See supra, text accompanying note 9.
26. Supra note 1, at 200 [1137b28–29].
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But this is meant to be true of all areas of human life. Moreover, if equity
is capable of remedying the law’s inflexibility, then what is the problem?
If equity permits judges to depart from legal justice when it is inconsistent
with absolute justice, then it should follow that no area of human life is too
complex to be regulated by law with a larger or smaller dose of equity.27
However, perhaps Aristotle meant to argue that some areas of human life
are so complex that it is impossible to fashion laws with respect to them
that approximate justice even for the most part. For an unstated reason, this
may be said to lead to the conclusion that law should not regulate in these
areas. Hence the suggestion is that Aristotle’s considered position is that it
may be appropriate for law to regulate those areas of human life in which
justice is capable of being closely approximated by general principle—
though general principle will never completely capture justice in any area
of life—while law must refrain from regulating those areas of life in which
general principle cannot even approximate justice.
However, it is worth remembering that this is not what Aristotle actually
says. Moreover, it is not clear that the reply succeeds. Rather, the correct
conclusion seems to be that in complex areas of life it is equity rather than law
that should do most of the actual governing. Hence Aristotle’s conclusion
that these areas require governance by “special ordinance” does not follow,
as the judicial enforcement of equity is supposed to be de rigueur.
For this reason, this reading cannot make sense of Aristotle’s distinction
between legal decision-making and arbitration. An “arbitrator goes by the
equity of a case, a judge by the law, and arbitration was invented with the
express purpose of securing full power for equity.”28 But according to
the doctrine of equitable discretion, this is no less true in law. On this view,
a judge too goes by the equity of the case: equity trumps. For Aristotle, the
distinction between judging and arbitrating involves a difference in kind,
but on the view expressed here it is at most a difference in degree.
C. Law Is General Principle
The above discussion also begs the following question—our third problem:
If courts are permitted to depart from legal rules when they conflict with
absolute justice, why does Aristotle insist that the law be expressed in terms of
general rules? Of course it is possible to invent reasons—for example, to give
27. Of course, there may be reasons other than complexity why the law should not regulate
in certain areas: privacy, liberty, etc. This is of no relevance to this argument and is in any event
not mentioned by Aristotle.
28. Aristotle,Rhetoric, supra note 1, at 2188 [1374a18–1374b23]. J.A.K. Thompson suggests
that when Aristotle refers to judges, he intends arbitrators. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 1,
at 180, note 2. However, this is mistaken. In contemporary Athens, judges were jurors repre-
sentative of the citizenry as a whole, whose role was to enforce law. Arbitration was a separate
matter. For instance, in private cases, arbitration was an alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nism available to parties who could agree on an arbitrator. RUSS VERSTEEG, LAW IN THE ANCIENT
WORLD 203–204, 214–216 (2002).
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the law a veneer of predictability—but these arguments are not Aristotle’s.
Moreover, in the Politics Aristotle insists:
it is impossible that all things should be precisely set down in writing; for
enactments must be universal, but actions are concerned with particulars.
Hence we infer that sometimes and in certain cases laws should be changed;
but when we look at the matter from another point of view, great caution
would seem to be required. For the habit of lightly changing the laws is an
evil, and, when the advantage is small, some errors both of lawgivers and rulers
had better be left . . . .29
This caution is in tension with the notion that judges are free to depart from
legal rules whenever they generate injustice. First, if the legislator must not
alter legislation, even when there is a small advantage in doing so, why is it
appropriate for judges routinely to depart from law on the basis of equity?
Second, it is not clear why small changes in the law are required at all. If
judges may depart from law on the basis of equity, then small, perhaps even
large, alterations to the law may effectively be made by judges.
Further:
The advocates of kingship maintain that the laws speak only in general terms,
and cannot provide for circumstances; and that for any science to abide by
written rules is absurd . . . . Hence it is clear that a government acting according
to written laws is plainly not the best. Yet surely the ruler cannot dispense with
the general principle which exists in law . . . .30
Although Aristotle is not expressing his own view as to the desirability of
kingship in this passage—Aristotle appears prepared to accept kingship if
it is clear that the king is significantly superior in virtue and wisdom to the
citizens31—it is clear that Aristotle is of the view that if a society opts for
the rule of law rather than the rule of man, then rulers must utilize general
principle. But if that is true of the rulers, then surely it must also be true of
judges.
Moreover, given Aristotle’s supposed attachment to equitable discretion,
his claim that the law must be expressed in terms of legal rules seems inco-
herent. According to the doctrine of equitable discretion, the law in fact is
not capable of being expressed in terms of general rules.32 Certainly, legal
rules are capable of being so expressed, but these are mere guidelines, rules
of thumb, rather than rules proper. The conclusion seems therefore to be,
29. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS, 49 [1269a10–16] (B. Jowett,
trans., 1996) (hereinafter “POLITICS”).
30. Id. at 85–86 [1286a10–16].
31. Id. at 87 [1286b9–21]. But see ETHICS, supra note 1, at 188 [1134a35–1134b3] (arguing
that the rule of law is to be preferred).
32. Remembering that we are not entitled to help ourselves to the jurisdictional distinction
between law and Equity.
Aristotle on Equity, Law, and Justice 41
despite Aristotle’s explicit claims to the contrary, that law is not capable of
being expressed in general principles.
D. The Equitable Man
Finally, the doctrine of equitable discretion seems inconsistent with Aris-
totle’s description of the equitable man. The equitable man “is one who
chooses and does equitable acts, and is not unduly insistent upon his rights,
but accepts less than his share, although he has the law on his side.”33 The
equitable man is one who does not always stand on his rights. But what
are his rights? The answer seems to be his entitlements according to legal
justice. But that answer is unsatisfactory. If courts enforce absolute justice
rather than legal justice, then there is no right to legal justice. The answer
implausibly implies that one has a legal right to something that a court will
not and should not enforce. Moreover, Aristotle claims that the equitable
man has law on his side, rather than on the side of justice. But again, this
seems to make sense only if we anachronistically rely on a jurisdictional
distinction between law and Equity.
We have seen, then, that there are serious problems with the idea that Aris-
totle accepts the doctrine of equitable discretion. His view of the relation-
ship between equity, justice, and law must be more complex and nuanced
than suggested. In the following section, I propose an alternative reading
of Aristotle’s view designed to avoid the problems encountered above.
V. SOLUTIONS
A. Legal Justice
If legal justice is not the justice that should motivate judges, then what is
it? Despite the tendency of common lawyers to read Aristotle otherwise,34 I
submit that his answer is clear: legal justice is the kind of justice appropriate
to legislation.35 For Aristotle, then, legal justice applies not to judges but to
legislators; it is not a judicial justice but a legislative justice.
Hence Aristotle says that equity is:
the sort of justice which goes beyond the written law. Its existence partly is and
partly is not intended by legislators; not intended, where they have noticed
no defect in the law; intended, where they find themselves unable to define
things exactly, and are obliged to legislate universally where matters hold only
for the most part; or where it is not easy to be complete owing to the endless
33. ETHICS, supra note 1, at 200 [1137b35–1138a3].
34. See supra note 11.
35. See also John E. Pattantyus, Aristotle’s Doctrine of Equity, 51 MODERN SCHOOLMAN 213, 217
(1974).
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possible cases presented, such as the kinds and sizes of weapons that may be
used to inflict wounds—a lifetime would be too short to make out a complete
list of these. If, then, a precise statement is impossible and yet legislation is
necessary, the law must be expressed in wide terms; and so, if a man has no
more than a finger-ring on his hand when he lifts it to strike or actually strikes
another man, he is guilty of a criminal act according to the written words of
the law; but he is innocent really, and it is equity that declares him to be so.36
And when he discusses the role of equity in remedying this error, he main-
tains that:
when the law states a general rule, and a case arises under this that is ex-
ceptional, then it is right, where the legislator owing to the generality of his
language has erred in not covering that case, to correct the omission by a ruling
such as the legislator himself would have given if he had been present there,
and as he would have enacted if he had been aware of the circumstances.37
The claim, then, is not that law in general—including our common law
(here meaning common law as opposed to statute law)—corresponds to
legal justice from which judges may depart. Rather, the notion is that leg-
islators should be motivated by legal justice, although it is understood that
legislation will be overly general:
in cases where it is necessary to make a general pronouncement, but impossible
to do so rightly, the law takes account of the majority of cases, though not
unaware that in this way errors are made. And the law is none the less right;
because the error lies not in the law nor in the legislator, but in the nature of
the case . . . .38
Because of this understanding, judges are permitted to depart from a lit-
eral interpretation of legislation when it is clear that such would produce a
result that the legislators would not have intended.39 There are two relevant
circumstances. First, the legislators may have passed legislation that would
produce a result that they would not have intended if interpreted literally in
circumstances that they did not consider. Here, Aristotle argues that judges
may interpret the legislation more flexibly to reflect the intentions the leg-
islators would have had had they turned their minds to such circumstances.
Second, the legislators may have known that in a certain circumstances the
legislation interpreted literally would work injustice, but may have been
36. Rhetoric, supra note 1, at 2188 [1374a18–1374b23].
37. ETHICS, supra note 1, at 199 [1137b20–24].
38. Id. at 199 [1137b15–18].
39. Cf. ZIVILGESETZBUCH art. 1 (Switzerland). “In the absence of an applicable legal provision,
the judge pronounces in accordance with customary law and, in the absence of a custom,
according to the rules that he would establish if he had to act as legislator.” The content of
legal justice is discussed infra notes 49, 55.
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unable to frame the legislation to avoid this. In such circumstances, Aristo-
tle maintains that judges may realize the actual intentions of the legislators
rather than their intentions as literally expressed in the legislation. The role
of equity in law, then, is to realize the intentions of the legislator not cap-
tured by the general principles expressed in the legislation. As we would say,
equity directs attention to the spirit rather than to the letter of the law.
Note that this does not mean that judges have the power to interpret
statutes in the light of absolute justice. Aristotle’s claim is only that judges
may attempt to realize the intent of the legislator, given that that intent will
not and cannot be captured in the form that legislation must take. This,
then, is far from the view that equity is justice’s rebellion against law.
B. Law Is General Principle
That equity in law is a principle of statutory interpretation also explains Aris-
totle’s endorsement for societies governed by the rule of law of the claim
that “surely the ruler cannot dispense with the general principle which exists
in law.”40 This is not an assertion of a moral principle—an assertion com-
pletely unsupported by argument—but rather the following practical point.
If a society is governed by more than one person, then a decision-making
procedure must be found for determining the decisions that are to govern
the society. The content of these decisions cannot be discovered merely by
asking any one individual. Hence the decisions must be expressed in some ob-
jective manner. In practice, this means that decisions must be expressed in
legislation, and legislation must be expressed in terms of general principles,
there being no other way of writing it.
Seeing that Aristotle’s discussion of equity in law is focused on legislation
allows us to solve two of our problems: the meaning of legal justice and
the need for law, meaning legislation, to be expressed in terms of general
principle. Two problems remain. These are understanding the equitable
man and the claim that some areas of life must be governed by arbitration
rather than by law. These are solved by shifting our attention away from law.
C. The Equitable Man
To whom is Aristotle’s discussion of equity directed? The usual answer is that
it is directed at the judge: Aristotle is concerned to elucidate appropriate ju-
dicial decision-making. No doubt this is one of Aristotle’s aims, as discussed
earlier in this section. However, it is not his sole objective. Recall that Aris-
totle’s discussion of equity occurs in the context of a examination of virtue.
The goal of the Ethics is not to provide a theory of law or of politics (at least
as we understand the latter term), but to present an account of how citizens
40. POLITICS, supra note 29, at 86 [1286a15–16].
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should live their lives. The focus, then, is not solely on the role of equity
in law but also on its place in ordinary life. In particular, the discussion is
concerned with the role equity plays in making a person just. This becomes
more apparent if we turn from J.A.K. Thompson’s translation of Aristotle’s
passage on the equitable man to Terence Irwin’s. “It is also evident from this
who the decent person is; for he is the one who decides on and does such
actions, not an exact stickler for justice in the bad way, but taking less than
he might even though he has the law on his side.”41
First, note that Irwin chooses the term “decency” rather than “equity,”
making clear that the focus is not on judges in courtrooms but on citizens
in their daily lives. It is also clear that the equitable or decent man is one
who accepts less than the law will give him. This does not mean that he takes
less than legislation would have given him were it not for the principles
of statutory interpretation (i.e., equity in law). It means what it says: the
equitable man is one who sometimes declines to enforce his legal rights. In
order to see why this would be, it is necessary to examine further Aristotle’s
view of the connection between justice and law.
i. Distributive Justice and the Law
As indicated above, Aristotle distinguishes between distributive justice and
corrective justice. Unsurprisingly, he argues that the content of the former is
essentially political. This is because distributive justice relies on a conception
of equality that is politically controversial.42 Thus:
Everyone agrees that justice in distribution must be in accordance with merit
in some sense, but they do not all mean the same kind of merit: the democratic
view is that the criterion is free birth; the oligarchic that it is wealth or good
family; the aristocratic that it is excellence.43
Accordingly, Aristotle is unable to elucidate the content of distributive justice
in the Ethics. That task must await a full exploration of political justice in the
Politics.
In Aristotle’s view, the aim of politics is to produce virtue and thereby
happiness in citizens.44 However, Aristotle recognizes that people disagree
as to the content of virtue and happiness; hence people disagree as to the ap-
propriate content of politics. Aristotle describes this dispute as conflict over
the constitution45 and characterizes the dispute as related to distributive
41. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 3, at 84 [1137b35–1138a3]. The interpretation I offer
in the following does not rely specifically on this translation, though this translation is more
suggestive than others.
42. ETHICS, supra note 1, at 177–178 [1131a20–25].
43. Id. at 178 [1131a25–29].
44. POLITICS, supra note 29, at 13 [1252b29–30]. Compare TERENCE IRWIN, ARISTOTLE’S FIRST
PRINCIPLES 425 (1988) (arguing that Aristotle’s theory is ambiguous as to whether politics aims
for the good of society as a whole or for the good of each individual).
45. The remainder of POLITICS deals with how the constitution is best implemented in
practice.
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justice.46 In the Politics, Aristotle elucidates and defends his conception of
the best constitution. Nevertheless, Aristotle insists that “the best is often
unattainable, and therefore the true legislator and statesman ought to be
acquainted, not only with that which is best in the abstract, but also with
that which is best relatively to circumstances.”47 Hence, although ideally all
states should adopt the best constitution, Aristotle recognizes that this is
impractical and that in practice states should adopt the best constitutions
they are able to adopt.48
Aristotle also insists that the laws of the state that relate to distributive
justice should reflect the constitution as it is rather than an ideal constitution.
“[T]he laws are, and ought to be, framed with a view to the constitution.”49
This means that a society’s laws may not and in fact are unlikely to capture
absolute distributive justice. Accordingly, with respect to these laws, the eq-
uitable man is the one who declines to enforce in his favor the laws that
instantiate the constitution’s conception of distributive justice when such
enforcement would conflict with distributive justice as it is in fact.
For instance, imagine that a state with an oligarchic constitution passes a
law that generates an obligation in the poor to serve the wealthy. Assume also
that democracy, rather than oligarchy, is consistent with absolute distributive
justice. Hence, while the law in question is compatible with the constitution,
it is inconsistent with absolute distributive justice. In such circumstances, an
equitable wealthy man would decline to enforce that law in his favor. He
would do so because, while he recognizes that the law is in accordance with
the conception of distributive justice captured in the constitution, he also
recognizes that the law is incompatible with absolute distributive justice.
Hence he takes “less than he might even though he has law on his side.”50
It is important to note that it does not follow that a judge is permitted to
refuse to enforce that law. To do so would be to undermine the notion that
a state is governed in accordance with its constitution. Were the equitable
man to find himself a judge, he would be obliged to enforce the law.51
ii. Corrective Justice and the Law
As indicated above, Aristotle is unable to give an account of the content of
distributive justice in the Ethics as he recognizes that that form of justice is
inescapably political. On the other hand, Aristotle does provide an account
46. POLITICS supra note 29, at 73 [1280a7–22]; Francisco L. Lisi, The Concept of Law in Aristotle’s
Politics, in 16 PROC. BOSTON AREA COLLOQUIUM ANCIENT PHIL., 29, 40–41 (John J. Cleary & Gary
M. Gurtler, eds., 2001).
47. POLITICS, supra note 29, at 92 [1288b25–28].
48. Id. at 92–93 [1288b34–1289a25].
49. Id. at 92 [1289a13–15]. The constitution, then, determines the content of distributive
legal justice.
50. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 3, at 84 [1138a2–3].
51. Similar points have led some to conclude that Aristotle was a legal positivist; see, e.g.,
Hans Kelsen, Aristotle’s Doctrine of Justice, in WHAT IS JUSTICE? JUSTICE, LAW, AND POLITICS IN THE
MIRROR OF SCIENCE: COLLECTED ESSAYS 110, 125–136 (2000). For discussion, see Burns, supra
note 17, at 162–166.
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of the content of corrective justice in the Ethics. He is able to do so be-
cause the concept of equality operative in corrective justice is not politically
controversial.52 Hence, for example, “it makes no difference whether a good
man has defrauded a bad one or vice versa, nor whether a good man or a
bad one has committed adultery; all that the law considers is the difference caused
by the injury.”53 Therefore the focus of corrective justice “is restricted and
retrospective; it does not consider either the common good, or even the
principles of distributive justice, but considers only the harm that has been
done and the means of restoring the status quo ante.”54 Accordingly, for Aris-
totle, the content of corrective justice is apolitical and does not depend on
the constitution.55
Now, Aristotle clearly believes that some areas of law appropriately in-
stantiate corrective justice.56 As the content of corrective justice does not
depend on politics or on the nature of the constitution, legal justice with
respect to those laws that instantiate corrective justice is coextensive with
absolute corrective justice. Hence in this area the equitable man cannot be
one who declines to enforce his legal rights because he recognizes that they
do not correspond to justice in fact. Here, then, an alternative explanation
of the equitable man is required.
One must recall that corrective justice is only part of justice. Accordingly,
the areas of law governed by corrective justice may conflict with distributive
justice. Moreover, modern experience has taught us that this conflict will
occur frequently.
A good example of this clash between the forms of justice can be observed
in the decision of the House of Lords in Bolton v. Stone.57 Members of the
defendant cricket club were playing against a visiting team when one of the
visitors drove the ball out of the ground and onto an adjacent little-used
road. The ball struck and injured the plaintiff. The court estimated that a
ball was driven out of the ground on average once every five years. The House
of Lords ruled that as the chance of injury was so low, the defendant was
not negligent. However, the cricket club had paid damages to the plaintiff
after it had been found liable in negligence by the Court of Appeal, and
the club made no effort to recover those damages after the decision of the
House of Lords. This is sometimes taken as evidence that the common law
is out of step with justice.58 For Aristotle, this conclusion is simplistic. The
common law may be entirely consistent with absolute corrective justice and
52. ETHICS, supra note 1, at 180 [1132a5–6].
53. Id. at 180 [1132a1–6] (emphasis added).
54. Irwin, supra note 44, at 429.
55. Hence the content of corrective legal justice is absolute corrective justice itself. Note that
this does not imply that whether corrective justice or distributive justice should be implemented
in any one case is an apolitical question. See Weinrib, supra note 11, at 70, 210–211.
56. ETHICS, supra note 1, at 179–186 [1131b25–1134a15].
57. 1951 App. Cas. 850 (H.L. 1951).
58. See, e.g., HAROLD LUNTZ & DAVID HAMBLY, TORTS: CASES AND COMMENTARY 196–197 (4th
ed., 1995).
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hence with the kind of justice appropriate in this area of the law. However,
corrective justice is not all there is to justice, and hence the cricket club may
have been acting equitably in not standing on its legal rights and allowing
the plaintiff to retain the damages originally paid. Here, then, we may say
that the defendant was right (as a matter of distributive justice) to allow
the plaintiff to retain the money and the House of Lords was right (as a
matter of corrective justice) to find for the defendant and hence allow the
defendant (also as a matter of corrective justice) to insist on the return of that
money.
With respect to this area of law, then, the equitable man is the one guided
by justice as a whole rather than by corrective justice alone. As there is no
form of justice that stands above distributive justice and corrective justice,
the equitable man must judge as to which should rule when those forms of
justice come into conflict. In some cases, the equitable man will be prepared
to accept less than his share according to law because he recognizes that the
law enforces only a part of justice.59
D. Law and Arbitration
The above also enables us to resolve our final outstanding problem: the need
for arbitration. In Aristotle’s view, law is unfit to govern some areas of human
life because justice with respect to those areas cannot be approximated
either by general principle, and hence by legislation, or by corrective justice.
These are the areas in which distributive justice is most appropriate but
cannot be approximated in legislation. In these areas, judges should be
replaced by arbitrators who are to rely on their sense of absolute justice.
In conclusion, then, equity plays two distinct roles. In law, it enables judges
to implement the intent of legislation rather than its literal meaning. Out-
side law, it requires citizens to question whether their legal rights are abso-
lutely just. It bears little resemblance to Equity in the common law and has
nothing to do with rebellion against law.
VI. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW
The above suggests, though it does not necessarily imply, a neat distinction
between public and private law. On this view, private law is based on cor-
rective justice, which is independent of distributive justice and politics, and
hence could operate outside specific legislation.60 On the other hand, public
59. See also Pattantyus, supra note 35, at 215–216. This argument also applies to the law based
on distributive justice. That is, sometimes the equitable man would decline to enforce in his
favor a law that correctly instantiates distributive justice, because that law is inconsistent with
corrective justice. This follows because there is no relationship of priority between corrective
and distributive justice. See infra, text accompanying note 67.
60. ETHICS,supra note 17, at 179–186 [1131b25–1134a15].
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law would be designed to reflect the nature of the constitution and would
correspond to the conception of distributive justice captured in the constitu-
tion. This would rely predominantly, or perhaps exclusively, on legislation.61
As I now show, an argument for this view is at least latent in Aristotle’s theory.
In the Politics, though arguing that aristocracy—the rule of the virtuous—
is the ideal form of government, Aristotle also insists that it is unlikely to
be realizable in practice.62 This is because aristocracy depends on the abil-
ity to determine and promote to power the truly virtuous and because it
supposes that there will be agreement on such. Because this is unrealistic,
Aristotle settles for polity, a combination of democracy and oligarchy in
which decision-making is distributed (unequally) through the citizenry. But
if that is so, then it cannot be appropriate for judges to decide matters of
distributive justice. Issues of distributive justice are political questions rightly
to be decided by political bodies, not by aristocratic judges. In this sense,
in court equity is “a mute divinity who cannot be heard.”63 On this view,
then, because of its inherently political nature, distributive justice is not an
appropriate subject for the courtroom unless embedded in legislation.
That argument, however, would not apply to corrective justice, as that
form of justice does not rest on political controversial views.64 Accordingly,
the judicial enforcement of corrective justice would not amount to judicial
aristocracy.
VII. ARISTOTLE’S FORMALISM
Whether or not the model enunciated in the previous section of this article
would have been accepted by Aristotle, the distinction between the kind
of law designed to reflect distributive justice and the kind of law based
on corrective justice is important in assessing whether Aristotle accepted
a version of legal formalism. Clearly Aristotle holds no formalist theory
with respect to the creation of law based on distributive justice. Distributive
justice possesses a form, but that form generates specific content only in
conjunction with a conception of virtue and happiness. But there are many
such conceptions, and it is the task of politics to choose between them.
However, this does not justify Gardner’s claim that Aristotle rejects the
notion “that law, so long as it remains true to its own distinctive form, can-
not but be just.”65 This is because, on Aristotle’s view, the kind of law that
relates to distributive justice (public law?) should reflect the conception of
distributive justice captured in the constitution. Hence, though the form of
distributive justice itself cannot generate specific content, in conjunction
61. Burns, supra note 51, at 163; Kelsen, supra note 51, at 133.
62. POLITICS, supra note 29, at bk. IV.
63. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 353, 391 [6:234]
(Mary Gregor, ed., 1996).
64. See supra, text accompanying notes 53–54.
65. Gardner, supra note 10, at 12.
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with a constitution it does do so. In a democratic society, the form of this
area of the law will be the form of democratic distributive justice. Hence,
in such a society, if the law relevant to distributive justice remains true to its
form—namely, democratic distributive justice—then it cannot but be just.
Certainly this does not mean that the law is absolutely just, as the democratic
conception of distributive justice may be false. Nevertheless, Aristotle insists
that this area of the law should reflect the constitution—“the laws are, and
ought to be, framed with a view to the constitution”66—and hence even if
the constitution is itself unjust, the law is just in the appropriate sense if it re-
flects the constitution. In other words, for Aristotle, the appropriate (ideal)
perspective from which to evaluate the justice of those laws relevant to dis-
tributive justice is not absolute distributive justice but the conception of
distributive justice as captured in the constitution. Accordingly, Aristotle’s
position at this point is recognizably formalist. On the other hand, Aristotle
holds that the appropriate perspective from which to evaluate the justice of
the constitution is absolute distributive justice. Unsurprisingly, Aristotle is
not a political formalist.
I turn now to the area of law governed by corrective justice (private law?).
The form of this law is corrective justice, and that form of justice in itself
generates specific content. Now, the form of this law is not justice in total
but it is a part of justice. Hence in this area too, if the law remains true to
its form then it cannot but be just.
But is this not a merely Pyrrhic victory? If an area of law instantiates only
corrective justice or only distributive justice, then it is not coextensive with
justice as a whole. It is, therefore, not really just. However, it is important to
remember that distributive and corrective justice are both forms of justice.
Aristotle does not argue that there is any priority between the two forms.67
It is not that distributive justice is real justice while corrective justice is only
a pale approximation, or vice versa. Nor is the view that there is a higher
form of justice of which corrective and distributive justice are elements.
Rather, corrective justice and distributive justice are the two forms of justice.
Corrective justice, then, is a part of justice, but it is not a partial justice. Hence
if the law instantiates corrective justice, then it really is just—not just in all
senses of the term “justice,” but nevertheless really just. Similarly, a law that
accurately captures distributive justice is genuinely just, though it is unlikely
to be consistent with corrective justice and hence is not just in all senses of
that term.
Note that it is no part of Aristotle’s view—and no part of the view of any
modern legal formalist—that the positive law that exists or has existed at any
point in time is necessarily just.68 Rather, the claim is that the positive law is
to be judged from the perspective of a particular form of justice—corrective
66. POLITICS supra note 29, at 92 [1289a13–15].
67. See supra note 59.
68. Weinrib, supra note 11, at 195, note 57.
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justice or the conception of distributive justice found in the constitution—
and hence that a form of justice can be said to underlie the positive law.
There is nothing self-congratulatory about this position. It is the view that
it is the task of the law—and hence the task of those whose responsibility
it is to shape the positive law—to actualize corrective justice or the concep-
tion of distributive justice found in the constitution. This is, of course, quite
consistent with the view that the positive law in many places fails to instan-
tiate these types of justice and is therefore objectionable. The position is
self-congratulatory only if “law” and “the form of the law” are anachronisti-
cally equated with “positive law.” The criticism, then, involves a positivistic
caricature of legal formalism and distorts our understanding of Aristotle’s
views.
